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Abstract
A recent paper by Frank and Goodman (2012) proposes
a Bayesian model of simple referential games. One of
the claims embodied in the model is that choosing which
word or property to use to refer to an object depends on
the utility of the property. In this paper, we compare
this model to other computational models of reference
production, in particular the recent pro (Probabilistic
Referential Overspecification) model. We argue that the
assumption of utility that guides property choice in the
Frank and Goodman (2012) model is inadequate, insofar
as it ignores the possibility of overspecification and the
role of preference rankings among properties, as a result
of which they may be used irrespective of their utility.
We show that models that do take this into account,
such as pro, have a better fit to experimental data in
which participants have the possibility of overspecifying.
Background: A Bayesian model of
property choice
In a recent paper, Frank and Goodman (2012) proposed
a Bayesian model of simple referential games (hereafter,
the FG model). The model computes the likelihood with
which a listener will identify the intended referent of a
description in a given context, as a function of (a) the
prior probability that the referent itself would be referred
to; and (b) the probability that the speaker would use
a particular property for the referent.1 It is with the
second of these that this paper is concerned.
Frank and Goodman adopt a rational actor model
of the speaker, whereby the probability that a speaker
chooses a property for a given referent depends on its
utility or informativeness. Letting p be some property
of the referent r, P be the set of available properties, and
|p| stand for the number of objects of which p is true, the
likelihood of using p, given a referent r and a context C,
is given in (1).
1Frank and Goodman (2012) refer to ‘words’ rather than
‘properties’. For the sake of generality, and in line with the
terminology used in the Referring Expressions Generation lit-
erature, we refer to properties throughout. Note that nothing
in the present discussion of the model hinges on this distinc-
tion.
P (w|r, C) = |p|
−1∑
q∈P |q|−1
(1)
This makes property utility a function of surprisal. If,
as suggested by the FG model, speakers compute such
quantities, their property choices will be maximally in-
formative for a listener whose task is to identify the in-
tended referent, since a property of the referent is more
likely to be selected if it is true of few (or no) other
objects.
Consider, for example, a context in which there are
two objects, one of which is the intended referent r. Sup-
pose r is a blue circle, while the other object is a red
circle. This makes the likelihood of using blue higher (at
0.67) than the likelihood of using circle (0.33), because
r is the only object with the property blue. Thus, this
calculation assumes that speakers will prioritise those
properties that are most discriminatory for the referent
in context.
Frank and Goodman tested the part of the model in
(1) against data collected in language games where par-
ticipants had to select (‘bet on’) which of two properties
a speaker would choose to describe one of the objects in
a given context. The task had the following characteris-
tics:
1. Speakers could only choose one property for a given
referent;
2. The options to choose from were verbalised in advance,
for example: Which word would you use, blue or cir-
cle?.
The predictions of the model were found to correlate very
highly with actual choices made in the experiment. Note,
however, that participants did not have the possibility of
choosing more than one property.
Referring Expression Generation
The aims of the FG model are similar in certain respects
to those of a number of models proposed in the compu-
tational literature on Referring Expression Generation
algorithms (reg; see Krahmer & van Deemter, 2012,
for an exhaustive review). One of the tasks of these
algorithms is to choose properties for an intended refer-
ent which jointly distinguish it from its distractors (the
other objects in context). In the reg literature, two
trends stand out in particular. Some algorithms priori-
tise brevity, seeking to produce descriptions which con-
tain as little extra information as possible beyond the
identification requirement, by taking into account their
discriminatory power. More recent work, however, has
shifted the focus from discriminatory power to other fac-
tors that affect speakers’ property choices, chief among
these being a property’s psychological salience or degree
of ‘preference’.
Brevity and discriminatory power
In early work on reg, algorithms sought to find the
shortest possible referring expression (the smallest possi-
ble set of properties) to distinguish the referent. For ex-
ample, the Full Brevity algorithm (Dale, 1989) searches
through possible descriptions in order of length, until a
distinguishing one is found.
Such heuristics were often motivated by an appeal to
the Gricean Maxim of Quantity (Grice, 1975), under the
assumption that more information than strictly required
to identify the referent would give rise to unintended
implicatures. However, finding the shortest possible de-
scription turns out to be intractable in the worst case,
because it amounts to an exhaustive search through all
available subsets of properties of the referent (Appelt,
1985; Reiter, 1990). In order to avoid this complexity, an
approximation was proposed by Dale (1989) in the form
of a Greedy Algorithm. Rather than searching through
the space of possible descriptions exhaustively, this algo-
rithm proceeds incrementally, adding a single property
at a time to the description. At each stage, it considers
the one that has the highest discriminatory value, that is,
excludes the greatest number of the remaining distrac-
tors. The procedure terminates when a distinguishing
description has been found, or all properties have been
considered.
To continue with our earlier example, if r is a blue cir-
cle and there is one other object, a red circle, the Greedy
Heuristic will first consider the property blue (because it
is more discriminatory than circle) and add it to the de-
scription. Since this fully distinguishes r from the other
object, the procedure terminates.
Property preference
More recent algorithms, starting with Dale and Reiter
(1995), have maintained the incremental approach to
property choice, but have de-emphasised the role of dis-
criminatory power in favour of other factors in property
selection. Dale and Reiter’s Incremental Algorithm (ia)
considers properties for inclusion primarily as a function
of the degree to which they are psychologically ‘pre-
ferred’ or ‘salient’. It achieves this by assuming that
properties are arranged in a fixed linear order, deter-
mined by their degree of preference, and then traversing
this list, checking each property in turn and including it
in the description if it excludes at least one distractor.
As with the Greedy heuristic, the procedure terminates
when a description is fully distinguishing or there are no
properties left to consider.
Suppose, for example, that shape properties are as-
sumed to be more salient or preferred than colour prop-
erties. Then, in our running example, the ia considers
circle first; however, this property does not exclude any
distractors (both objects are circles) and is therefore not
included. The algorithm next considers blue and selects
it. In this case, the outcome is similar to that of the
Greedy Heuristic. Note, however, that the algorithm can
overspecify (i.e. include more information than strictly
required for identification) in some cases. Suppose that
in addition to the two circles in the example, there is
also a red square. Then, on first considering the shape
property circle, the ia would include it because it now
excludes one distractor; the eventual outcome is the de-
scription blue circle, even though in this context too, blue
would have sufficed.
The preference-based heuristic was inspired by a large
body of psycholinguistic evidence showing that speakers
overspecify by including highly preferred properties, es-
pecially an object’s colour (Pechmann, 1989; Eikmeyer
& Ahlse`n, 1996; Belke & Meyer, 2002; Arts, 2004; En-
gelhardt, Bailey, & Ferreira, 2006, among many oth-
ers). Such properties tend to be used by speakers even
when they appear to violate the Gricean Maxim of
Quantity; indeed, these findings go against the grain of
early psychological theorising about reference which, like
the early reg models, emphasised discriminatory value
(e.g. Olson, 1970). Recent comparative evaluations of
reg algorithms have also found that those incorporat-
ing preference-based heuristics match speaker behaviour
better, compared to those that emphasise discriminatory
power (Gatt & Belz, 2010; van Deemter, Gatt, Sluis, &
Power, 2012).
The Frank and Goodman model and REG
The classic reg algorithms reviewed above are entirely
deterministic, in that, given a particular context and a
referent, they always return the same description. This
makes them poor models of human speaker behaviour
(van Deemter, Gatt, van Gompel, & Krahmer, 2012).
Frank and Goodman’s approach makes property choice
probabilistic and is therefore arguably more compatible
with what is observed in experimental settings.
However, there is one crucial respect in which the un-
derlying assumptions of the FG model seem to go against
the psycholinguistic evidence on reference production, in
that it ignores preference-based heuristics. Indeed, mod-
ulo its non-determinism, Frank and Goodman’s model
(a) Size condition
(b) Colour condition
(c) Colour or size condition
Figure 1: Experimental domains
of the speaker is related to the first approach to reg
described above, since utility is dependent on discrimi-
natory power.
By contrast, evidence for overspecification would not
only argue against a strict interpretation of the Gricean
communicative maxims in reference production, but also
suggests that speakers may not be ‘rational’ agents
whose choices are solely guided by utility. Rather, speak-
ers may be relying on simple, preference-based heuris-
tics that override slower cognitive processes (e.g. Tver-
sky & Kahneman, 1982). Interestingly, this seems to
be the case even though overspecification may actually
be detrimental to listeners, insofar as properties which
aren’t required for identification may slow down a lis-
tener’s search for the intended referent based on the in-
coming description (Engelhardt, Baris Demiral, & Fer-
reira, 2011).
This discussion raises the question whether there could
be a better approach to the speaker’s choice problem in
reference production, one that combines the virtues of
non-determinism with more psycholinguistically plausi-
ble heuristics that do not rely exclusively on utility or
discriminatory value. In the next section, we describe a
model that was developed to take both of these issues
into account.
The PRO Model
The pro (Probabilistic Referential Overspecification)
model (van Gompel, Gatt, Krahmer, & van Deemter,
2012) was designed on the basis of experiments with
Dutch and English speakers, and sought to give a
more precise account of referential choices, combining
preference-based heuristics and non-determinism (see
Gatt, van Gompel, Krahmer, & van Deemter, 2011, for
full details of the experiment).
In the experiments, participants were engaged in a
simple director-matcher task in which one participant,
the speaker, described a target referent from a group of
three objects, to a listener who could see exactly the
same objects. Speakers were instructed to describe ob-
jects in a way that would allow the listener to identify
the intended referent.
Participants were exposed to trials in three different
conditions, as shown in Figure 1. Each trial consisted of
pictures of three objects, one of which was marked as the
intended referent which a speaker had to identify for her
listener. In the trials, objects could be described on the
basis of two properties, size and colour, in addition to
their type. These two properties were chosen because a
clear distinction has been found between them in the lit-
erature (e.g. Eikmeyer & Ahlse`n, 1996; Belke & Meyer,
2002): colour is highly preferred and tends to be used
even when not required; size, in contrast, only tends to
be used if absolutely required, presumably because it is
a relative property.2
Trials were constructed so that either colour alone (C;
Figure 1(a)), or size alone (S; Figure 1(b)) sufficed to
identify the target referent. In each condition, the other
property was also discriminating, but did not identify
the referent completely, because it only excluded one
distractor. In a third, baseline condition (C/S; Figure
1(c)) either property was fully discriminatory. The ex-
periment was replicated with both Dutch and English
speakers.
The proportions of choices of referring expressions are
shown in Table 1. As expected, they show a clear prefer-
ence for colour. For instance, in the S condition, where
colour is not required, most speakers (78% in Dutch,
80% in English) opted for a description containing both
colour and size. By contrast, in the C condition there are
relatively few overspecified descriptions containing both
properties (10% in Dutch, 8% in English). In the C/S
condition, the majority of speakers opted for a colour-
2Type was not considered in this experiment, under the
assumption that speakers will always select an object’s type
in constructing a description; see for example Pechmann
(1989) and Dale and Reiter (1995). Note, however, that a
second experiment was also conducted, similar to the one re-
ported here, in which the discriminatory value of type and
colour were manipulated and size played no role. In condi-
tions where type alone sufficed to identify the referent, most
speakers (70%) produced descriptions containing only this
property. In conditions where colour alone sufficed, over 90%
of speakers produced descriptions containing both type and
colour, in line with our assumption in the experiment sum-
marised here. The pro model described below was also fitted
to data from these experiments, with predictions within 3%
of observed proportions. See van Gompel et al. (2012) for
details.
Table 1: Percentage of each description type in the experiment for Dutch and English speakers. Frequencies are in
parentheses.
Description
Colour only Size only Colour and size
Size sufficient (S) Dutch 0.3 (1) 21.1 (80) 78.6 (297)
English 3.3 (12) 16.5 (59) 80.2 (288)
Colour sufficient (C) Dutch 89.5 (334) 0.3 (1) 10.2 (38)
English 91.9 (327) 0 (0) 8.1 (29)
Colour or size (C/S) (baseline) Dutch 70.8 (266) 3.7 (14) 25.5 (96)
English 79.1 (280) 3.7 (13) 17.2 (61)
only description.
Modelling property choice
The pro model, shown schematically in Figure , assumes
that speakers always first select the property that is fully
discriminating (size in Figure 1(a), colour in 1(b)). If
there is more than one such property (as in Figure 1(c)),
then one property is initially selected probabilistically,
according to preference. After they add the first prop-
erty, speakers may add a second property. Once again,
the probability of doing this depends on the property’s
degree of preference.
Thus, pro combines both discriminatory power and
preference, and does so non-deterministically. The
model has two parameters: x is a maximum-likelihood
estimate of the probability of using colour (its ‘prefer-
ence’), while y is an additional parameter that represents
the likelihood or ‘eagerness’ to overspecify on the part
of a speaker.
The predictions of pro were compared to the data ob-
tained in our experiments. The model predicted propor-
tions for all expressions in the three conditions within 2%
of the observed frequencies (it also accounts for speech
repairs where speakers initially underspecify, but subse-
quently add a second property; see van Gompel et al.,
2012). As an example, Table 2 displays predictions for
the English data.
Consider now the predictions of the FG model in rela-
tion to the data presented above. Recall that the model
does not take into account the possibility of overspecifi-
cation: the experimental task against which the predic-
tions of (1) were compared only allowed participants to
choose one property for an object. However, it is instruc-
tive to look at the predicted probabilities for the use of
each property in each of the experimental conditions in
Figure 1. These are shown in Table 3.
The main observation here is that the FG model sys-
tematically overestimates the probability of using a dis-
preferred property (size) and underestimates the prob-
ability of using a preferred one (colour). For exam-
ple, in the S condition depicted in Figure 1(a), green
refers to two objects, while large refers to only one. The
model predicts a probability of 0.33 of using green, with
Table 3: Predicted probability by the Frank and Good-
man model of using colour or size in each experimental
condition
Colour Size
Size Sufficient (S) 0.33 0.67
Colour sufficient (C) 0.67 0.33
Colour or size (C/S) 0.5 0.5
a probability of 0.67 of using small. In the C/S condi-
tion, where either size or colour suffices to distinguish
the object (Figure 1(c)), the model predicts that either
property is equally probable (0.5). These predictions are
clearly incompatible with the data, where 80% of the En-
glish descriptions in the S condition included both colour
and size, while the use of colour in the C/S condition is
well above chance.
Discussion
Frank and Goodman’s Bayesian model assumes a model
of the speaker as a rational agent whose choices in a
reference task are based on utility. As we have argued,
this assumption is compatible with that made by certain
Referring Expression Generation algorithms. By con-
trast, models such as the Incremental Algorithm (Dale
& Reiter, 1995) or pro emphasise the role of prefer-
ences rather than utility or discriminatory power. When
their predictions are compared on the same experimen-
tal data, it turns out that, while pro predicts speaker
choices quite accurately, the Bayesian model does not,
because it misrepresents the extent to which a property
is preferred over others.
One reason for the mismatch may be that Frank and
Goodman tested their model against data from commu-
nicative situations which are different from the referen-
tial contexts in our experiment. Specifically, participants
in their experiments were asked to select exactly one
property out of two and were told which words to use
(‘blue or circle?’). This may have caused participants
to explicitly evaluate the properties and choose the one
that rules out most distractors. This was not the case in
the experiment summarised above, where speakers were
simply instructed to identify the target referent for their
Figure 2: The pro Model; x = probability of selecting colour; y = ovserspecification likelihood. Using x = .8673
and y = −.0531, pro fits the English data almost perfectly. The same is true of the model fitted to the Dutch data.
Table 2: pro predictions for each description type, by condition. Parameters: x = .8673; y = −.0531
Description
Colour only Size only Colour and size
Size sufficient (S) 0 0.19 0.81
Colour sufficient (C) 0.92 0 0.08
Colour or size (C/S) 0.80 0.02 0.18
listeners and had no a priori limit on how much infor-
mation to include.
However, a more crucial difference between the two
models is that, while pro explicitly seeks to model
preference-based heuristics, Frank and Goodman do not
consider this, excluding the possibility that properties
selected by speakers may be redundant for the purposes
of identification. We have argued that this is a weak-
ness of the model because the robust psycholinguistic
and computational findings in this regard suggest that a
completely rational, utility-based account cannot be an
accurate model of the speaker.
If speakers systematically include properties that are
not ‘useful’ for identification – that is, do not contribute
to the discriminatory value of an identifying description
– then clearly they are not making choices purely on
the basis of utility. Rather, as we have suggested above,
these ‘preferences’ suggest that (at least in visual do-
mains of the sort that we and Frank and Goodman have
explored), choices are also made on the basis of simpler
heuristics, relying on perceptual or cognitive salience.
Thus our conclusion is that, while any psychologically
realistic model of reference production has to be non-
deterministic (as Frank and Goodman suggest), the as-
sumption that speaker behaviour is guided by a utility-
based heuristic is probably false.
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